We thus employ a computational model to evaluate the relative contribution of these approaches to ending insurgency, using Bennett’s ( 2008) computational model of early stages of insurgency as a starting point. One cannot draw a direct comparison between the military and aid approaches from observational data, because the availability of sample data is not sufficient to support a parametric analysis. This leads us to ask: what is an effective balance between these approaches? Could sufficient investment in one strategy overcome the lack of investment in another strategy? And in particular, this paper asks whether it is possible for a state to use well-designed local aid programs to compensate for a military strategy that targets civilians. Governments frequently face constraints on the total resources available for providing aid or for developing precisely-targeted military campaigns. Based on these findings, a reasonable counterinsurgency campaign would avoid targeting civilians and would provide aid to civilians. Second, small-budget, well-designed, local aid programs that improve civilians’ lives increase support for the state among civilians (e.g., Berman et al. First, counterinsurgency campaigns that target civilians indiscriminately increase support for insurgency among civilians (e.g., Condra and Shapiro 2012). Two findings in the counterinsurgency literature suggest desired elements of a successful counterinsurgency strategy. If establishing security and providing public goods are both important in defeating an insurgency, then what is their relative contribution to achieving the desired outcome for the government? In practical terms, how should states allocate their finite resources when designing counterinsurgency campaigns? However, while we understand that states must mix aid and military strategies, it is less well-understood how different mixtures of these strategies might succeed or fail at defeating an insurgency.
The US government explicitly notes that both military and economic means will be necessary to defeat insurgency ( US Army Field Manual 3-24 2006, 1-11). And in practice, even proponents of an aid strategy acknowledge that some military action to stop insurgents will be necessary when those insurgents are engaging in effective violence. But while governments may understand that providing aid to a population in order to sway popular sentiment is a good idea, doing so may be expensive and difficult under violent conditions. The advocates of a more peaceful approach emphasize that providing security and aid to the population will increase the support of communities for the government rather than insurgents. Such observers fear that governments can be their own worst enemies when they use violence indiscriminately to try to defeat an insurgency. 2013 Galula 2006) agree that a government's peaceful interaction with the population is critical in defeating insurgency. Policymakers ( Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency 2012 Nagl 2002 Petraeus 2006 Sepp 2005 US Army Field Manual 3-24 2006, 1-11) and academics ( Berman, Shapiro and Felter 2011 Berman et al.
As the United States continues to find itself engaged in military action against non-state actors in places such as Afghanistan and Syria, understanding the effectiveness of alternative strategies available to insurgents and counterinsurgents remains an important area of study.